Gavin Barwell: I will now run through the remaining compulsory purchase measures in the Bill. Clause 22 is the key measure of all the CPO measures in the Bill. It wipes the slate clean of more than 100 years of sometimes conflicting statute and case law about how compensation should be assessed, and it establishes a clear, new statutory framework for doing so.
The core principle of compulsory purchase compensation, which is not altered by the Bill, is that the land should be acquired at market value in the absence of the scheme underlying the compulsory purchase. Any increase or decrease in land values arising from the scheme is therefore disregarded for the purposes of assessing compensation.
The problem is that since the “no-scheme world” principle was first established, it has been interpreted in a number of complex and sometimes contradictory ways. That lack of clarity can make negotiations over the level of compensation difficult, resulting in unnecessary delays. The clause will therefore clarify the position by creating a statutory no-scheme principle and setting out a series of clear rules to establish the methodology of valuation in the no-scheme world.
The clause will also extend the definition of the scheme to include relevant transport projects where they have made the regeneration or redevelopment scheme that is the subject of the compulsory purchase possible. I will say more about that later. The Committee will be delighted to hear that I will not go through the clause line by line, but focus on a few key points.
Subsection (3) will replace sections 6 to 9 of the Land Compensation Act 1961, which set out how the scheme is to be disregarded when assessing compensation. Proposed section 6A in the Land Compensation Act will maintain the fundamental principle that any increases or decreases in value caused by the scheme, or the prospect of the scheme, should be disregarded, and lists the assumptions to be made. If there is a dispute about compensation and the parties have to go to the Upper Tribunal to resolve it, proposed new section 6D clarifies how to identify the scheme that must be disregarded.
The default position is set out in proposed section 6D(1): that the scheme to be disregarded means the scheme of development underlying the compulsory acquisition—usually the current compulsory purchase order. If an acquiring authority wants to assert to the Tribunal that a scheme to be disregarded covers a larger area than the underlying scheme of development, it can do so only if that was identified at the outset in the  authorising instrument or associated documents, when the acquiring authority started the compulsory purchase process. I hope that is clear.
In proposed section 6D(2) we have replicated the current special provisions for new towns and urban development areas. This special status means that all development within these designated areas forms part of the scheme to be disregarded, so the value of later acquisitions within a new town area will not be influenced by earlier developments within that area. We have extended this special provision to mayoral development areas as well.
We have also made special provision where regeneration or redevelopment schemes have been made possible only by relevant transport projects. I said I would say a few more words about this. New transport projects will often raise land values around nodes or hubs—HS2 is a good example. Where that makes regeneration or redevelopment attractive, but the private sector is unable to bring a scheme forward, public authorities might have to step in by using their compulsory purchase powers to help bring forward the regeneration.
In those circumstances, when assessing the compensation that people might receive if their property is acquired through compulsion by a public authority, the regeneration or redevelopment scheme will be able to include the relevant transport projects as part of the scheme to be disregarded in the no-scheme world. This is a complicated area of law, so let me try to make it as clear as possible. What that means is that the land will be valued without the uplift caused by the public investment in the transport project. This is one of only two bits in the Bill that change the compensation people might get if some of their property is subject to compulsory purchase.
The provision is subject to some very important safeguards to ensure that it is proportionate and fair to all. They are as follows. The prospect of regeneration or redevelopment must have been included in the initial published justification for the relevant transport project. In other words, an acquiring authority could not come along to a piece of land that had been improved by a transport project 20 or 30 years ago, when no mention of this redevelopment happened, and use this legislation to try to drive down the price of compensation. The instrument authorising the compulsory acquisition must have been made or prepared in draft on, or after, the day on which this provision comes into force. The regeneration or redevelopment scheme must be in the vicinity of the relevant transport project. The relevant transport project must be open for use no earlier than five years after this provision comes into force—they must not be existing schemes. Any compulsory purchase for regeneration or redevelopment must be authorised within five years of the relevant transport project first coming into use.
Importantly, if the owner acquired the land after plans for the relevant transport project were announced, but before 8 September 2016—the date on which we announced we were going to do this—the underlying scheme will not be treated as though it included the relevant transport project. In other words, the provision should not be retrospective for people who acquired the land before they might have known the Government were going to change the law in this way.
I recognise that extending the definition of the scheme in this way will mean that some claimants receive less compensation than might otherwise have been the case.  However, I hope that the Committee shares my view that it is right that the public, rather than private interests, benefit from public investment into major transport projects. Having increased neighbouring land values by providing new or improved transport links, the public sector should not then have to pay more when acquiring land for subsequent development that was envisaged when that transport project was announced, and would not otherwise have been possible. The provision will ensure that the public purse does not have to pay the landowner land values inflated by previous investment that the public sector has already made.
I turn now to clause 23. Part 4 of the Land Compensation Act 1961 provides that in certain circumstances a person whose land has been acquired by compulsion may be entitled to claim additional compensation. That additional compensation entitlement arises if, within 10 years, planning permission is granted for development on  the land that causes an increase in its value which was not taken into account in the original assessment of compensation.
Part 4 therefore introduces an element of uncertainty and unknown risk about compensation liability for the acquiring authority, leading inevitably to increased costs, which are often dealt with by paying insurance premiums. In the Government’s view it also provides an opportunity for an unearned windfall for claimants. Compensation under the ordinary rules already reflects the full market of the land at the valuation date, with all its present and future potential, including any hope value for future development. Under part 4 a claimant is treated as though they have retained their investment and interest in the acquired land and so can benefit from any increase in value generated by subsequent planning permission. No such expectation would arise on any ordinary sale in the private market. Therefore, although it is little used, I believe that for the reasons I have set out the provision is unfair. Its repeal will reduce the risk and uncertainty for acquiring authorities, while maintaining the principle of fair compensation for claimants.
Clause 24 introduces a statutory timeframe—there is none at present—for the acquiring authority to serve a confirmation notice on all interested parties, attach  a confirmation notice on or near the land, and publish a copy of it in the local press. Although most acquiring authorities are keen to push ahead with their scheme and publish the confirmation notice quickly, for a variety of reasons some delay. Those delays prolong the uncertainty facing those with an interest in the land. Depending on their length, delays can also result in delays to much needed new housing, which is what the Bill is ultimately about.
Clause 25 ensures that the entitlement to compensation for disturbance of a business operating from a property that is acquired by compulsion is fair to all tenants and licensees. This is an area where we are changing the law to make compensation more generous. At present there is an anomaly that means that licensees who have no interest in the land that is being taken are entitled to more generous compensation for the disturbance of their business than those with a minor or unprotected tenancy with an interest in the property. That is because  where property occupied by a licensee is acquired, the law on disturbance compensation allows account to be taken of the period for which the land they occupied might reasonably have been expected to be available for the purpose of their trade or business, and of the availability of other land suitable to the purpose.
However, for those with a minor or unprotected tenancy with a break clause or a short unexpired term, case law has held that for the relevant purposes it must be assumed that the landlord would terminate their interest at the earliest opportunity, whether or not that would actually have happened in reality. Clause 25 removes that anomaly and brings the compensation entitlement for businesses with minor or unprotected tenancies into line with the more generous compensation payable to licensees.
Clause 26 enables either the Greater London Authority or Transport for London, or both, to acquire all the land needed for a joint transport and regeneration or housing scheme on behalf of the other. My hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire may be aware of the problem that exists. At the present time, to bring forward a comprehensive redevelopment scheme in London, two compulsory purchase orders are needed—one promoted by the Greater London Authority for the regeneration or housing elements; and the other promoted by Transport for London for the transport scheme. That clearly makes no sense at all. It adds complexity and delay to the process and causes confusion among those affected. Clause 26 will remove the artificial division and allow the Greater London Authority and Transport for London to use their existing powers more effectively by enabling them to promote joint compulsory purchase orders, or allowing one to acquire land on behalf of the other. In so doing, it will speed up the process and make it clearer for everyone.
Finally, clauses 27 to 30 contain amendments to a small number of provisions on compulsory purchase in the Housing and Planning Act 2016, to ensure that the technical detail operates as intended. I hope that I have given a useful description of what the remaining clauses do.

Roberta Blackman-Woods: I thank the Minister for his helpful run-through of the CPO clauses in the Bill. I have a couple of specific questions about clause 22, but I want to say at the outset that those are probing questions because we agree with the overall thrust of the clause. I think that the Minister has taken some tentative steps down the road of socialism in protecting the public interest in the way that might happen under the clause. We absolutely agree with the broad intention of the clause. It is right that it applies to new towns and mayoral developments, and to an extent to transport, to try to facilitate, in particular, the larger scale development that is very much needed. Nevertheless, there are a few questions about how compensation will be decided under proposed section 6D(2) to (4), which is what my questions specifically relate to. At the moment it does not look as though any claims under the proposed section can be referred to the Upper Tribunal. If that is not the correct interpretation, perhaps the Minister will clarify that.
We know that the no-scheme principle is central to a fair assessment of compensation and that the scope of the disregarded scheme must be appropriate so that  proper compensation is paid. The Government have included proposed section 6D(5) under clause 22 to safeguard the public purse in circumstances where it is appropriate to disregard a wider scheme. Where the appropriateness of doing so is challenged, the Upper Tribunal is empowered to determine the matter. Can the Minister explain what safeguards exist where a scheme is extended instead under proposed section 6D(2) to (4), where the recourse to the Upper Tribunal does not exist and all qualifying schemes, regardless of merit or circumstances, will be extended as a matter of law? I am sure that he has sensible reasons for including them but, to ensure that there is confidence out there in the development sector, we might need to hear a little more about why that is the case—if indeed it is the case.
Does the Minister agree that, as desirable as it is to recover the benefits of public investment, such recovery should be made from all those who benefit and should not discriminate against those who are already bearing the impact of losing their homes or businesses to make way for the scheme? The extension of the scope of the scheme in proposed section 6D(2) to (4) without any appeal or consideration of the facts of a case means that there could be injustice to homeowners and small businesses as well as investors and developers that  own land affected by such schemes. It goes beyond ensuring fair compensation, which is assured by proposed section 6D(5).
My point is that the Government must avoid poorly targeted policies to recover the benefit of public investment and must introduce separately a properly considered mechanism that might build on existing schemes such as the tax incremental funding and community infrastructure levy schemes, which properly focus the recovery of value from past and future public investment.
Those are my questions for the Minister. As I have said, we agree very much with the basic provisions of clause 22, but there is perhaps a need to put something else into the public record about why they are being introduced in the way they are. Perhaps he should look at the limitations for appeal under proposed section 6D(2) to (4). Does he think anything more needs to be done, or will the scheme as outlined put in place appropriate safeguards for those who might be concerned about the extension of the wider scheme, in particular, and the extension to transport? Overall, we can see the rationale for the Government wanting to do that.
I move on to new clause 13. We have had a helpful discussion about CPO. We had a rather lengthier discussion about CPO during the passage of what is now the Housing and Planning Act 2016. I also looked at CPO powers under the previous Government’s Infrastructure Act 2015. Having recognised that CPO powers and the legislation underpinning them are very complex, we are in danger of the Government going on with the process of simply amending CPO powers and tinkering with the system, making it more complex, I suspect, rather than less. However, there seems to be a view across all parties that we need to review this in its entirety and bring forward a much more consolidated and rationalised piece of legislation that will be much easier for local authorities and developers to get their heads around.
Unfortunately, I do not have with me the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015. The last time I asked the Government to introduce a piece of consolidated legislation  on permitted development, I did not think I was going to get 167 pages in return, plus an additional 12 pages a couple of months ago, separate from that order, so I have some anxieties in proposing this new clause.
CPO legislation goes back a very long way—I think to 1845, with parts of that legislation still used—and it might be about time to think of consolidating it. We are not the only ones to think so. Colin Cottage from the CPA—which is the Compulsory Purchase Association, not the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, although that might have an interest in CPO—told the Committee:
“The existing system is not helpful for reaching quick solutions. In fact, in many ways it encourages people to be fighting with each other from the outset. Ultimately, that increases the uncertainty, conflict and cost. That is really the issue that we have to look to address in order to give ourselves a more streamlined system.”––[Official Report, Neighbourhood Planning Public Bill Committee, 18 October 2016; c. 64, Q114.]
Richard Asher from the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors said:
“I believe, and the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors has always believed, that codification of the whole of the CPO rules, which go back to 1845 and are highly complex, would be a sensible way forward. I think the simplification of the rules for CPO would be a major step forward…I think the complexity often deters people—particularly local authorities, in my experience—from using CPO powers. It also results in a number of CPOs being refused or rejected by the courts because of the complexity of the rules that surround them.”––[Official Report, Neighbourhood Planning Public Bill Committee, 18 October 2016; c. 63, Q114.]
If ever there were an argument for simplifying, rationalising, streamlining and consolidating a bit of legislation, surely it is that the courts, simply because they are finding the legislation too difficult and complex, are throwing out what might be bona fide requests for a CPO.
I appreciate that the Government have been consulting on CPO reform. The consultation document appears to have been issued before the Committee sat, so I thought we should acknowledge that. We got not only the consultation but the Government’s response. That is a bit of good practice that I suggest the Government use elsewhere but, alas, the Government did not consult on whether the whole scheme should be reviewed. They asked about various aspects of the reform, which is a step forward. If the consultation has led to the measures in clause 22, it is a good thing. However, it is time for a fundamental review of not only the primary legislation but the secondary legislation on compulsory purchase. A full-scale rationalisation and consolidation would be an extremely helpful way forward.
We all know—and I think this view is shared across the whole House—that we have to deliver more homes. I hope that the Minister shares our view that those homes have to be delivered in communities. We should be about place making and not just building homes. The areas that those homes are in will need to be underpinned by appropriate infrastructure. In this country, we are poor at bringing forward the infrastructure that we need on time. Having a rationalised, much more straightforward CPO system would definitely help us to bring forward the necessary infrastructure in a timelier manner.
Very helpfully, Colin Cottage of the Compulsory Purchase Association pointed to some examples from other places that the CPA feels do compulsory purchase  better than we do in the UK. I do not know whether that is the case, but it might be helpful for the Minister to look into that. Colin Cottage mentioned America, which he said had a more streamlined system where,
“81% of land value compensation assessments are agreed immediately, and another 4% settle after a short period of time. Only the remaining 15% are then contested for any lengthy period of time. That is a much higher strike rate than we have in this country.”––[Official Report, Neighbourhood Planning Public Bill Committee, 18 October 2016; c. 65, Q116.]
It would be very interesting to hear whether the Minister or his Department have any intention of looking for international examples that might help to bring forward land more clearly through a revised CPO system. Examples of countries that manage to get to an agreement on compensation much more quickly would be helpful.
The British Chambers of Commerce pointed us to the French system. In these Brexit days, we are perhaps not meant to look to France or other European countries for example of good practice. Nevertheless, the BCC said that the French system had an enhanced CPO compensation scheme that enabled particularly large-scale transport projects to be brought forward more quickly. The Minister might like to look at that suggestion. I will leave that argument there. I know that the Minister reads the Lyons report regularly, so he will know that we made a very comprehensive argument in it for reviewing compulsory purchase legislation in this country. I will not repeat that argument here; I have summarised it as succinctly as I can. I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say.

(1) The Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 28 insert—
 (1) The Secretary of State may direct two or more local planning authorities to prepare a joint development plan document.
(2) The Secretary of State may give a direction under this section in relation to a document whether or not it is specified in the local development schemes of the local planning authorities in question as a document which is to be prepared jointly with one or more other local planning authorities.
(3) The Secretary of State may give a direction under this section only if the Secretary of State considers that to do so will facilitate the more effective planning of the development and use of land in the area of one or more of the local planning authorities in question.
(4) A direction under this section may specify—
(a) the area to be covered by the joint development plan document to which the direction relates;
(b) the matters to be covered by that document;
(c) the timetable for preparation of that document.
(5) The Secretary of State must, when giving a direction under this section, notify the local planning authorities to which it applies of the reasons for giving it.
(6) If the Secretary of State gives a direction under this section, the Secretary of State may direct the local planning authorities to which it is given to amend their local development schemes so that they cover the joint development plan document to which it relates.
(7) A joint development plan document is a development plan document which is, or is required to be, prepared jointly by two or more local planning authorities pursuant to a direction under this section.
 (1) This Part applies for the purposes of any step which may be or is required to be taken in relation to a joint development plan document as it applies for the purposes of any step which may be or is required to be taken in relation to a development plan document.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) anything which must be done by or in relation to a local planning authority in connection with a development plan document must be done by or in relation to each of the authorities mentioned in section 28A(1) in connection with a joint development plan document .
(3) If the authorities mentioned in section 28A(1) include a London borough council or a Mayoral development corporation, the requirements of this Part in relation to the spatial development strategy also apply.
(4) Those requirements also apply if—
(a) a combined authority established under section 103 of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 has the function of preparing the spatial development strategy for the combined authority’s area, and
(b) the authorities mentioned in section 28A(1) include a local planningauthority whose area is within, or is the same as, the area of the combined authority.
 (1) The Secretary of State may modify or withdraw a direction under section 28A by notice in writing to the authorities to which it was given.
(2) The Secretary of State must, when modifying or withdrawing a direction under section 28A, notify the local planning authorities to which it was given of the reasons for the modification or withdrawal.
(3) The following provisions of this section apply if—
(a) the Secretary of State withdraws a direction under section 28A, or
(b) the Secretary of State modifies a direction under that section so that it ceases to apply to one or more of the local planning authorities to which it was given.
(4) Any step taken in relation to the joint development plan document to which the direction related is to be treated as a step taken by—
(a) a local planning authority to which the direction applied for the purposes of any corresponding document prepared by them, or
(b) two or more local planning authorities to which the direction applied for the purposes of any corresponding joint development plan document prepared by them.
(5) Any independent examination of a joint development plan document to which the direction related must be suspended.
(6) If before the end of the period prescribed for the purposes of this subsection a local planning authority to which the direction applied request the Secretary of State to do so, the Secretary of State may direct that—
(a) the examination is resumed in relation to—
(i) any corresponding document prepared by a local planning authority to which the direction applied, or
(ii) any corresponding joint development plan document prepared by two or more local planning authorities to which the direction applied, and
(b) any step taken for the purposes of the suspended examination has effect for the purposes of the resumed examination.
(7) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision as to what is a corresponding document or a corresponding joint development plan document for the purposes of this section.”
(3) In section 21 (intervention by Secretary of State) after subsection (11) insert—
“(12) In the case of a joint local development document or a joint development plan document, the Secretary of State may apportion liability for the expenditure on such basis as the Secretary of State thinks just between the local planning authorities who have prepared the document.”
(4) In section 27 (Secretary of State’s default powers) after subsection (9) insert—
“(10) In the case of a joint local development document or a joint development plan document, the Secretary of State may apportion liability for the expenditure on such basis as the Secretary of State thinks just between the local planning authorities for whom the document has been prepared.”
(5) Section 28 (joint local development documents) is amended in accordance with subsections (6) and (7).
(6) In subsection (9) for paragraph (a) substitute—
“(a) the examination is resumed in relation to—
(i) any corresponding document prepared by an authority which were a party to the agreement, or
(ii) any corresponding joint local development document prepared by two or more other authorities which were parties to the agreement;”.
(7) In subsection (11) (meaning of “corresponding document”) at the end insert “or a corresponding joint local development document for the purposes of this section.”
(8) In section 37 (interpretation) after subsection (5B) insert—
“(5C) Joint local development document must be construed in accordance with section 28(10).
(5D) Joint development plan document must be construed in accordance with section 28A(7). ”
(9) Schedule A1 (default powers exercisable by Mayor of London, combined authority and county council) is amended in accordance with subsections (10) and (11).
(10) In paragraph 3 (powers exercised by the Mayor of London) after sub-paragraph (3) insert—
“(4) In the case of a joint local development document or a joint development plan document, the Mayor may apportion liability for the expenditure on such basis as the Mayor thinks just between the councils for whom the document has been prepared.”
(11) In paragraph 7 (powers exercised by combined authority) after sub-paragraph (3) insert—
“(4) In the case of a joint local development document or a joint development plan document, the combined authority may apportion liability for the expenditure on such basis as the authority considers just between the authorities for whom the document has been prepared.”
This new clause enables the Secretary of State to give a direction requiring two or more local planning authorities to prepare a joint development plan document. It also makes provision about the consequences of withdrawal or modification of such a direction.

Amendment (a) to Government new clause 4, in proposed new subsection (12) of section 21 of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004, at end insert
“after consulting with the local authorities concerned.”

Gavin Barwell: If I may, before I turn to specific amendment, I would like to make introductory remarks about the amendments that we are debating here, and the next couple, which sit together, to a degree, in policy terms, although we shall debate them separately. This is really about our proposed approach to ensuring that all communities benefit from the certainty and clarity that a local plan can provide. I hope that what I say will provide helpful context.
The planning system is at the heart of the Government’s plans to boost housing supply. It is not the only thing that we need to do to build more homes; but certainly, one of the crucial ingredients of the strategy that we shall set out in the White Paper will be to release enough land in the right parts of the country to meet housing need. However, rather than having a top-down system in which central Government decide where the housing goes, the Government passionately believe in a bottom-up system where communities take the decisions. There is one caveat: that councillors should not be able to duck taking the tough decisions. In my view, my role in the system is to ensure that each community in the country takes the necessary decisions to meet housing need. How they do it should be a matter for them.
A second objective, looking at the matter from the viewpoint of those who want to build homes, is that the planning system should give them certainty about where the homes can be built, and where they should not try to build homes. That is why we have a longstanding commitment to a local plan-led system, which identifies what development is needed in an area, and sets out where it should and should not go, and so provides certainty for those who want to invest.
Local planning authorities have had more than a decade to produce a local plan. The majority—more than 70%—have done so. However, not every local authority has made the same progress towards getting a plan in place, and there are some gaps in parts of the country where plans are needed most. We have made clear our expectation that all local planning authorities should have a local plan. We have provided targeted support through the LGA’s planning advisory service and the Planning Inspectorate, to assist them in doing do. We have also been clear about the fact that local plans should be kept up to date, to ensure that the policies in them remain relevant. If that is not happening it is right for the Government to take action.
We invited a panel of experts to consider how local plan-making could be made more efficient and effective. The local plans expert group recommended a clear statutory requirement for all authorities to produce a plan. We agree that the requirement to have a local plan should not be in doubt. However, as long as authorities have policies to address their strategic housing and other priorities they should have freedom about the type of plan most appropriate to their area. In fact, the constituency of the hon. Member for Oldham West and Royton is an example of a part of the country where a decision has been taken to work with a strategic plan over a wider area, rather than 10 individual local plans.
Effective planning, which meets the housing, economic and infrastructure needs of the people who live in an area, does not need to be constrained by planning authority boundaries. We want more co-operation and joint planning for authorities to plan strategically with their neighbours, ensuring, together, that they can meet the housing and other needs of their areas. There are opportunities to improve the accessibility of plans to local people. The amendments that we propose will strengthen planning in those areas.
New clause 4 enables the Secretary of State to direct two or more local planning authorities to prepare a joint development plan document—the documents that comprise an authority’s local plan—if he considers that that will facilitate the more effective planning of the development and use of land in one or more of those authorities. Where we direct authorities to prepare a joint plan, the local planning authorities will work together to prepare it. They will then each decide whether to adopt the joint plan.
The country’s need for housing is not constrained by neighbourhood, district or county boundaries. The system needs to support planning and decision making at the right functional level of geography.

Roberta Blackman-Woods: I shall address my introductory remarks to the Minister’s general points about the importance of local plan-making. I say at the outset that Opposition members of the Committee have noticed and welcomed the difference in tone and the slight change in policy direction that have come with the new Minister. I agree about the importance of having communities at the heart of local plan-making. When  planning is done really well and people are involved in planning their neighbourhoods, we are much more likely to get the sort of development that supports our placemaking objectives, and that is supported by local people. Critically, in my experience, the involvement of local communities drives up the quality of what is delivered locally. We totally agree with the Minister that, where possible, local communities should be at the heart of planning and local authorities should work with their neighbourhoods to draw up a local plan.
Nevertheless, like the Minister, we recognise that if a local plan is not in place, local communities and neighbourhoods are at risk of receiving really inappropriate development. To determine applications, a council is likely to rely on saved local policies, if it has them, from a previous plan which might be out of date. What often happens in my experience—this is particularly true recently, with local authorities concerned about the number of applications they reject in case they subsequently get overturned on appeal—is that decisions go through that might not be in the best interests of the local authority or the local community, simply because a local plan is not in place.
I am pleased that the Minister consulted the local plan expert group in thinking about how to bring forward the provisions in new clause 4. The people on that group are very knowledgeable about the planning system. Nevertheless, he did not need to do that. He just needed to pick up his copy of the Lyons report —I know he has one—and turn to page 62. On that page he will find our arguments as to why in certain circumstances it might be necessary for the Secretary of State to intervene in local plan-making when, for whatever reason, local plans are not coming forward from the local authority.
The Minister knows that one of the major reasons for plans’ not coming forward or being thrown out by the inspector is that councils are not suitably addressing the duty to co-operate. When we were taking evidence for the Lyons review, a number of councillors said, “The real problem is that we cannot meet housing need in our area because we do not have enough land available. We cannot put a proper five-year land supply in place because we simply do not have the land available.”
From memory, two examples that stood out were Stevenage and the city of Oxford. They have substantial housing need and a strong demand for housing, but they do not have enough land within their specific local authority boundary to meet that need. Under the Government’s legislation, the duty to co-operate would come into play. Those authorities would sit down and make a decision.
The city of Oxford needed South Oxfordshire to bring forward some land, and Stevenage required its neighbouring authorities to bring forward some land. Alas, the duty to co-operate did not work the Government had envisaged. The land did not come forward in those neighbouring authorities’ plans, and that placed both the city of Oxford and Stevenage in the rather difficult situation of having acute housing need but no means by which to meet that need. There are many other such examples around the country.
We listened to a lot of evidence in the Lyons review. In an ideal world, one would not want to give powers to the Secretary of State to direct authorities to come together and produce a plan, but if they are not doing  so, they are putting their communities at risk of not meeting housing need, which is acute in some areas. We therefore decided reluctantly—very much like the Minister—that powers should be given to the Secretary of State in limited circumstances to direct local authorities.
The new clause refers to,
“two or more local planning authorities”.
That is one way forward. Another that we thought of would be to look at the area covered by strategic housing market assessments and perhaps make that subject to direction by the Secretary of State, but a few local authorities coming together in the appropriate area is just as good a way forward.
As the Committee will have gathered from what I am saying, the Opposition do not have any particular problems with new clause 4, but I have some specific questions. First, will the Minister clarify who decides exactly what is in the document? Perhaps I misheard him, but I think he said it would be up to local authorities themselves, under the provisions in proposed new section 28A, to decide exactly how they would put the plan together. My reading, though, is that that proposed new section gives powers to the Secretary of State to determine exactly what is in the documents and what they might look like.
Proposed new section 28A(4) says that the Secretary of State can give a direction about:
“(a) the area to be covered by the joint development plan document to which the direction relates;
(b) the matters to be covered by that document;
(c) the timetable for preparation of that document
I have absolutely no problem with that—it seems to us to be an entirely sensible way forward when local plan-making arrangements have broken down for whatever reason—but it does seem to suggest that it will not be the local councils that will be deciding what the documents cover. In those circumstances, it will be the Secretary of State.